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"Science" plays a central role in litigation today. Civil litigants
spend hours briefing and arguing the value of expert testimony. Stud
ies performed years previously are taken apart and evaluated in de
tail. Criminal defendants are convicted or exonerated based on DNA
evidence. And all of the evidence comes in through expert testimony,
from witnesses who seek to explain the scientific issues to a lay jury,
often in the form of opinion testimony.1 This testimony can, and often
does, dictate the outcome of cases.
Courts wrestle with the admissibility and use of scientific evidence
every day, and have developed an evolving set of standards to apply to
those decisions. They are seeking, at least in part, to have legal factfinders consider only evidence that has already been deemed reliable
in science-in other words, to have law follow science. The most re
cent iteration of the standards adopted to further those goals started,
of course, with Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 With that
case and throughout the cases that followed, courts have sought to use
science's paradigms of "reliability" as the standards of admissibility. If
the scientific community has approved of the methods or conclusions
(through peer-reviewed publication and other criteria), the courts con
clude that those methods or conclusions should be admitted. The
1.

While I focus on "scientific" evidence, most of the Article is equally applicable to
all forms of expert testimony that have a foundation in traditional academic re
search. I intentionally leave "science" undefined, especially given the fact that
my arguments are not limited to any particular area of study. Additionally, cre
ating a satisfactory definition would be difficult, to say the least. One that may
be helpful for these purposes is the following: "Science is not an encyclopedic body
of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing
and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further
testing and refinement." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. (Daubert1), 509 U.S.
579, 590 (1993) (quoting Brief for American Association for the Advancement of
Science et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-8).
2. Daubert1, 509 U.S. 579. Many gallons of ink have been spilled on Daubert and
its progeny, and I make no effort to summarize all of them here.
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courts (and many commentators) believe that making legal standards
track the perceived scientific standards improves the quality of fact
finding-that scientists' standards of reliability should be courts' stan
dards of reliability.
In making this Daubertshift-more closely linking admissibility to
scientific standards of reliability-the courts paid little attention, if
any, to the potential impact making such a shift could have on science
itself, or how it could affect the nature and quality of the scientific
evidence being presented to fact-finders, usually a jury. In this Arti
cle, the first in a broader project in law and science, I explore two un
expected consequences of joining science and law at the hip, and
consider whether these consequences represent reciprocal contamina
3
tion, or instead cross-fertilization, of law and science.
In the first unexpected consequence, the reliance (perhaps overre
liance) on peer-reviewed publication in admissibility decisionmaking
has resulted in aggressive litigation discovery into the peer-review
process. Documents from the peer-review process have been subpoe
naed and the participants in that process have been deposed, all with
an eye to undermining the perceived value of the peer-review process,
and, possibly, to purposefully deterring the future involvement in that
very process by researchers and reviewers. This discovery was de
scribed in one instance as "'harassment to silence independent re
search' and an effort to create 'a chilling effect on folks who tell the
truth."' 4 Under this view, letting lawyers into the citadel of science in
this way could weaken science's ability to assist the legal fact-finding
process and to assist society more generally, by creating disincentives
for scholars to participate in the peer-review process or to be fully hon
est in that process. These disincentives may be created whether or not
the litigants intend them.
In the second unexpected consequence, the focus on following sci
ence's paradigms (again most notably peer review) has resulted in
what can be called "litigation-driven scholarship." Some expert wit
nesses have performed litigation-related research and essentially sub
mitted their expert reports to peer-reviewed journals in what appears
to be, at least in part, an attempt to bolster the likelihood of their
testimony being admitted.5 These efforts may cheapen the value of
3. By "cross-fertilization" I refer to the agricultural concept (also called allogamy) of
crossing a male from one species and a female from another. In the same way
that crossing gametes in plants can create a disease-resistant plant or crossing
an Angus bull with a Hereford cow can result in a faster-growing calf than a
purebred calf of either species, I argue below that the interchange between law
and science can strengthen both.
4. Jon Wiener, Cancer,Chemicals andHistory: CompaniesAre UsingNew Tactics to
Insure Their Misdeeds Aren't Revealed in Court, NATION, Feb. 7, 2005, at 19.
5. Conversely, and importantly, some researchers who first become scholars on a
subject later are recruited as litigation experts. Of course, the lag time between
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the paradigmatic reliability indicators in science and decrease the
quality of scholarship presented to fact-finders (and to consumers of
scholarship), reversing one core idea of the shift-that law should fol
low science, rather than the reverse. Many observers find such schol
arship unseemly, if not outright untrustworthy, due to the obvious
potential for bias.6
This Article explores the conflicts I conclude are inevitable in ef
7
forts to join law and science together. The two disciplines' magisteria
overlap, but not precisely, and that lack of fit creates problems and
opportunities for both. I conclude that it is far from self-evident that
the "contamination" of science by law (e.g., lawyers meddling in peer
review) or of law by science (e.g., litigation-driven scholarship showing
up in litigation) necessarily weakens either science or law. Instead,
they may serve as a check on each other and on other potential
problems.
In fact, the reciprocal line-crossing-of litigators into the peer-re
view process, and of litigation experts into the peer-reviewed scholar
ship-may make both law and science stronger and provide a better
understanding of both. A complete understanding and exploration of
the peer-review process by litigants and the court would improve both
law and science. Thus, rather than contamination, such interactions
should be considered as cross-fertilization, strengthening both. The
complex interplay between these overlapping and competing magis
teria may cause discomfort and (hopefully transient) confusion, but it
should be cautiously welcomed, not avoided.
I proceed in four parts. First, in Part I, I provide a brief review of
the evolution of legal standards for the admissibility of what is termed
"scientific evidence," including Frye and Daubert and their progeny. I
also explore the stated and unstated goals of the shift from Frye's fo
research being completed and the review and publication process being completed
can undermine either effort, but, especially in major litigation, the lag is not so
great as to preclude it. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Peter F. Infante, The Past Suppression of Industry Knowledge of the
Toxicity of Benzene to Humans and PotentialBias in FutureBenzene Research, 12
INT'L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 268 (2006) (criticizing industry research

into benzene toxicity as biased). Of note, the author, Peter Infante, is a frequent
litigation expert witness for plaintiffs in benzene litigation; that affiliation is not
disclosed in the article. See Bette Hileman, Daubert Rules Challenge Courts,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Jul. 7, 2003, at 14 (noting Infante's work as a

paid expert).
7. "Magisteria" is a term for the teaching authority of a particular area of inquiry
"a word derived not from any concept of majesty or awe but from the different
notion of teaching, for magister is Latin for 'teacher.'" Steven Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, 106 NAT. HIST. 16, 19 (1997). One can think of magis
teria as areas of authority-the relevant subject areas of disciplines. Gould used
the term in an essay about the purported conflicts between evolution and relig
ious belief, concluding that religion and science need not have overlapping magis
teria and thus that religion and science can coexist. See id.
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cus on the "general acceptance" of the expert's approach to Daubert's
emphasis on the reliability and relevancy of the expert's methodology.
Second, I give a (necessarily limited) overview of certain modern
scientific paradigms of reliability. In Part II, I explore the realities of
peer reviews and of other institutions in science that are relied upon
in evidentiary determinations. Among other things, I explore the his
tory of peer review in science and establish that only relatively re
cently did peer review become a central aspect of general scientific
scholarship. Further, I conclude that the factors judges and litigators
see as binary-for example, either the method is peer reviewed or it is
not-are not nearly so simple to resolve. That Part, among other
things, includes examples of exactly what peer reviewers are asked to
do from various journals, duties that can vary significantly. Put more
bluntly, there is peer review, and then there is peer review-and even
careful and thorough peer review can miss fraud, as recent high-pro
file cases have shown. This conclusion will be important in evaluating
whether the unexpected consequences of Daubert are problematic.
Third, in Part III, I describe two phenomena (summarized above)
that are, to my knowledge, relatively new, and are almost certainly
the direct result of courts' emphasis on peer review as a criterion for
the admission of expert testimony. The first phenomenon is discovery
in litigation into the peer-review process-document and testimonial
discovery exploring and challenging the peer-review process with the
purpose of undermining the admissibility of testimony relying on the
reviewed publication. The prospect of being put through such discov
ery may create incentives for scientists to refuse to participate in such
a process; it may weaken the honesty of the comments provided in
that process; it may be used to intimidate other potential experts; and
it may impinge upon academic freedom. At the same time, it may pro
vide valuable and relevant evidence of the reliability of the methods
and conclusions in the publication and educate the courts about the
nature of peer review.
The second phenomenon discussed in Part III is related: scholar
ship that appears to be produced (and submitted to peer-reviewed
8. Here, and throughout the Article, I focus on editorial peer review-that is, the
review that takes place as part of publication decisions. The ongoing evaluation
of scientific research by others, publications of challenging counterpoints, and so
on all constitute what some commentators identify as "true peer review." See
Effie J. Chan, Note, The "BraveNew World" of Daubert: True PeerReview, Edito
rial PeerReview, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 100 (1995). Some
courts, too, recognize this broader (and perhaps more important) concept of peer
review. See infra note 39. Arguably, there are two levels of peer review prior to
editorial peer review: what could be called "local peer review" (intra- and inter
institutional informal discussions, for example) and "editor peer review" (the
first-cut determination by a journal editor). Daubert, however, put the focus on
editorial peer review and the phenomena I discuss are in that area as well.
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publications), at least in part, to increase the odds of the authors' opin
ions being admitted in litigation. This bootstrapping may result in
published work that would not otherwise be published-and perhaps
should not, under some standards, be published. And indeed, some
research motivated by litigation may never be performed at all in the
absence of litigation. Research may be published too soon (or sooner
than it otherwise would have been) because the litigation schedule as
sociated with the research is more time-pressured than the scientific
community's. Science works incrementally; lawyers (especially those
on a contingent fee) have every reason to work fast; statutes of limita
tions, the time value of money, and the ethical obligation to represent
one's client zealously all work together to make a litigation timeline
much shorter than a pure research timeline might be. This incentive
to create scholarship may result in the publication of whole new areas
of purported expertise that have not previously been published and
that may not genuinely be proper subjects of expert testimony-scien
tists opining about the ethics of defendants, for example.
Finally, in Part IV, I explore the likely ultimate consequences of
the development of discovery into peer review and litigation-driven
scholarship and conclude that they are not so bad after all. The phe
nomena are especially acceptable if they both occur, as they work to
balance each other; though I do not limit my conclusions to the situa
tion in which both take place. In both contexts, I provide safeguards
that courts, authors, and journals could adopt to mitigate the poten
tial harm of both litigation-driven scholarship and peer-review
discovery.
As for litigants taking discovery into the peer-review process, what
is meant by "peer review" varies widely, and it is sensible to permit
litigants to explore the quality of the peer review involved when its
conclusions are being used against them. That process will better ed
ucate the courts about how much reliance to place on peer review as
an indicator for reliability, much in the way that Daubert has edu
cated judges about science and its methods more generally. Further,
discovery into peer review can provide a rough analogue to what is
called post-publication peer review, and that can only help, rather
than hurt, the continued development of reliable knowledge in both
science and law. The concerns about disincentives to participants in
that process are not trivial, but they are relatively minor and can be
mitigated relatively inexpensively and without undercutting the criti
cal features of peer-reviewed scholarship. My conclusions are strong
est in the context where the peer-reviewed author is acting as a
litigation expert, but are not limited to that context.
Similarly, while there is something unseemly about articles pub
lished by litigation experts with an intention to assist the litigants,
there are sufficient gatekeepers in place to conclude that such scholar
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ship is not inherently bad.9 Between peer review itself, strong disclo
sure requirements (which I contend should be made stronger,
including a requirement that litigation-driven scholarship authors
disclose their payments for litigation work), and the availability of dis
covery into the process, the potential negative impact of that scholar
ship is minimized. Further, the resources that litigants can bring to
bear-especially in mass tort cases, which for economic reasons are
the sort of cases where these events tend to arise-may result in im
portant research being performed that otherwise would be performed
later or never. The fact that litigants are funding such work is un
doubtedly important in its evaluation (and, again, mitigates in favor of
permitting discovery into the publication process), but that fact should
not, by itself, make the scholarship either unpublishable in journals or
inadmissible in court, especially when comparable bias is present in
many articles that are admitted without a fight.
I.

FROM FRYE TO DAUBERT, KUMHO TIRE, AND BEYOND:
A FOCUS ON METHODS, NOT QUALIFICATIONS

It is nearly automatic for lawyers, judges, and commentators to
blurt out "gatekeeper!" any time Daubert is mentioned. Indeed, the
case emphasizes the importance of judges preventing unreliable ex
pert testimony from being heard by the jury, and has by most accounts
increased the scrutiny given to proffered expert testimony.10
Prior to Daubert(and still present in states in which Daubert or its
equivalent has not been adopted), the prevailing standard was the
"general acceptance" standard ofFrye v. United States.II Frye, taking
up less than two pages in the FederalReporter, evaluated the admissi
bility of expert testimony regarding an early lie detector test in a crim
inal trial. The court, after briefly summarizing the theory underlying
the test, 12 concluded that testimony based on that theory could not be
admitted:
9. And the unseemliness may be no greater than when the research is performed
specifically to support the approval and marketing of a drug, for instance. That
said, my perception is that most attorneys and scientists are more uncomfortable
with litigation-driven scholarship than with, for example, clinical trials spon
sored by a drug maker, though that discomfort may be a function of a lack of
familiarity. While research for approval or marketing purposes has existed for
years, litigation-driven scholarship is clearly newer.
10. See, e.g., D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath
Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Wrought?, 29 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 329,
329-36 (2001). This more exacting examination has occurred despite the Court's
references to the opinion reflecting a "liberalizing" of standards. See infra note 15
and accompanying text.
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. "[T]he theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious
effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is re
flected in the blood pressure." Id. at 1014.
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de
have gainedgeneral accept
duction is made must be sufficiently establishedto
13
ance in the particularfield in which it belongs.

Thus, Frye's focus is on the general acceptance of the expert's prin
ciple by those in the expert's field of inquiry, along with the basic re
quirement that the expert be generally qualified to speak about the
subject.
In 1993, the Supreme Court considered the proper restrictions on
expert testimony given the adoption of the FederalRules of Evidence
[hereinafter FederalRules], concluding first that the rules superseded
Frye.14 In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that Frye's "rigid
'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.'" 15 Parsing the lan
guage of Rule 702 of the FederalRules, the Court concluded that the
expert's testimony must be "scientific" and relate to "scientific knowl
edge," which "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science" and "connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation."16
Based on that interpretation of the FederalRules, Daubertfocuses
than
trial courts more precisely on the expert's methodology rather
7
the acceptance of the expert's more general field of work.1 Most im
portant for purposes of this Article, Daubertenumerates nonexclusive
criteria for consideration relevant to reliability: testability,1 8 peer review, 19 error rate, 20 control standards, and (echoing Frye) general ac

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

Id. (emphasis added).
See DaubertI, 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993).
Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
Id. at 589-90. The case also addresses further the issues of qualification and fit,
but those discussions are not directly relevant to the subject of this Article.
See id. at 592-93.
"Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether
it can be (and has been) tested." Id. at 593.
"The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a
relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity
of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised." Id. at
594.
"[In the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should con
sider the known or potential rate of error . . . ." Id.
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ceptance. 2 1 These factors were drawn in large part from an effort to
define "scientific" in the ways that the Court believed scientists did.22
The post-Daubert amendment to Rule 702 and its official com
ments expressly incorporated those criteria and added several more:
whether the expert's work is litigation-specific, whether the expert is
unjustifiably extrapolating to an improper conclusion, whether the ex
pert has accounted for alternative explanations, whether the expert's
work is as cautious in litigation as it would be in ordinary work, and
whether the expert's claimed field of expertise is known for reaching
reliable results. 2 3 What "reliable" means in connection with method
ology can vary, of course-a proper method to measure the tempera
ture of a liquid is presumably a fairly precise question, while the
proper method to evaluate the likelihood of user confusion in the face
of a particular drug label may be more nebulous.
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has established that the stan
dard of review of district court decisions is abuse of discretion 24 and
established that the Daubert approach is to be used in all expert testi
mony evaluation,
not just what might traditionally be called
"science." 25
Consider for a moment the criteria adopted by Daubert and de
scribed in the comments to Rule 702, and take note of the wiggle room
present in virtually every one:
* Testability: "whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has
been tested-that is, whether the expert's theory can be chal
lenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be as
26
sessed for reliability";
" Peer review: "whether the technique or theory has been subjected
2
to peer review and publication; 7
* Errorrate: "the known or potential rate of error of the technique or
theory when applied";28
21. "Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community'... may properly be viewed with skepticism." Id.
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
22. See id. at 592-94.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 702. David Bernstein has argued that the adoption of Rule 702
superseded Daubert. See, e.g., Posting of David Bernstein to the Volokh Conspir
acy, http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1147021015.shtml (May 6, 2006, 09:29 PDT).
Such a conclusion does not conflict with my arguments.
24. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
25. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
26. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Control standards:"the existence and maintenance of standards
29
and controls";
* General acceptance: "whether the technique or theory has been
30
generally accepted in the scientific community";
" Litigation-based:"Whether experts are 'proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have de
3
veloped their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying"'; 1
" Extrapolation:"Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated
from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion."32
" Alternative explanations:"Whether the expert has adequately ac
counted for obvious alternative explanations."33
* Level of care: "Whether the expert 'is being as careful as he would
be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation
34
consulting."'
" Reliability of field: "Whether the field of expertise claimed by the
expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the
35
expert would give."
The only one of the bunch that at least seems binary-i.e., it is
either there or it is not-is peer review. Its presence can be deter
mined with a single yes-or-no question: "Has the methodology you are
following been subjected to peer review?" (And, as discussed below, if
the expert can say, "Yes, and my conclusion on this very issue has
been peer reviewed too," so much the better.) Given the apparent ease
of evaluating it as a factor, litigants and courts tend to focus on peer
review, if not to the exclusion of other factors, at least more heavily
than Daubertand the drafters of Rule 702 might have intended. 3 6 Put
*

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995)).
32. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment (citing Gen
eral Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
33. Id. (citing Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994)).
34. Id. (quoting Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.
1997)).
35. Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999)). This factor
is relevant when the purported discipline itself lacks reliability-for example,
"astrology or necromancy." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151.
36. The DaubertI Court itself was rather cautious in describing peer review's value,
which suggests that courts that rely on peer review to the exclusion of other fac
tors may do so contrary to the Court's intentions.
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua
non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability....
and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not
have been published .... Some propositions, moreover, are too particu

lar, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to
the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science,'
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another way, in considering the panoply of criteria in play, courts
might be expected to latch onto peer review as an easy one to consider.
And indeed, that is what has happened, at least in some cases.
One need go no further than the Ninth Circuit's consideration of
the remanded Daubert case itself to see one of many examples of this
sort of enthusiasm for peer review. Discussing the scenario where the
proposed testimony is not derived from independent research, the
court looked for "other objective, verifiable evidence that the testi
mony is based on 'scientifically valid principles."' As an example of
such evidence, the Ninth Circuit suggested that "[o]ne means of show
ing this is by proof that the research and analysis supporting the prof
fered conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny
through peer review and publication." 37
The court then drops a footnote: "We refer, of course, to publication
in a generally-recognized scientific journal that conditions publication
on a bona fide process of peer review. . . ."38 The court continued:
Peer review and publication do not, of course, guarantee that the conclusions
reached are correct; much published scientific research is greeted with intense
skepticism and is not borne out by further research. But the test under
Daubertis not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of
his methodology. That the research is accepted for publication in a reputable
scientific journal after being subjected to the usual rigors of peer review is a
significant indication that it is taken seriously by other
scientists, i.e., that it
39
meets at least the minimal criteria of good science.
in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected.
DaubertI, 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citations omitted).
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (DaubertII), 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.
1995).
38. Id. at 1318 n.6.
39. Id. Similarly, the Northern District of Georgia has dismissed an unpublished
study as having "little probative value" because it was "not subject to peer re
view." Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
See also, e.g., Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co., 80 F. App'x 883, 887-88 (4th Cir. 2003)
("Peer review helps to ensure that research papers are scientifically accurate,
meet the standards of the scientific method, and are relevant to other scientists
in the field .... [P]eer review involves scientists submitting a manuscript to a
scientific publication in the field, journal editors soliciting critical reviews from
other experts in the field and deciding whether the scientist has [generally] em
ployed sound science."); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313
(5th Cir. 1989) ("While we do not hold that this failure [to be peer reviewed], in
and of itself, renders his conclusions inadmissible, courts must nonetheless be
especially skeptical of medical and other scientific evidence that has not been
subjected to thorough peer review.").
Certainly many courts understand the complexity of peer review and recog
nize that publication peer review is far from a guarantee-or even necessarily a
particularly strong indication-of reliability of either methodology or result, pos
sibly to an extreme. See, e.g., Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F.
Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996) (minimizing the value of editorial peer review); State v.
O'Key, 321 Ore. 285, 304 (Or. 1995) (noting limitations of peer review). As to
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It is therefore clear that whether or not the Court or the Advisory
Committee intended it, peer review has become a central part of ex
pert evaluation. Because of that centrality, litigants have done what
we might have expected, and some of those actions make lawyers and
scientists uncomfortable. Before addressing those consequences and
the discomfort, a discussion of peer review as an indicator of scientific
reliability is appropriate.
II.

THE REALITIES OF PEER REVIEW

Judging from many judicial discussions of peer review, one could
be forgiven for thinking that peer review dated to the earliest develop
ment of science, and that perhaps peer reviewers were excommuni
cated along with Galileo for approving the publication of his thoughts
about the shape of the planet. But in fact, peer review in its current
form is a relatively new concept and it is far from infallible.
Though peer review probably started in the mid-1700s, 40 as re
cently as the 1950s peer review was part of publishing in only some
journals in some disciplines. 4 1 Thus, for example, Crick and Watson's
seminal article in Nature on the structure of DNA was not peer re
viewed, not because (as various stories tell it) they did not want to tip
off other researchers (in particular Linus Pauling) or because there
was nobody competent to review it, but instead because Nature-then
as now one of a handful of the undisputed leading journals in the
world-simply had no peer-review process. As described in an annota
tion to a reprint of the paper,
Nature (founded in 1869)-and hundreds of other scientific journals-help
push science forward by providing a venue for researchers to publish and de
bate findings. Today, journals also validate the quality of this research
through a rigorous evaluation called peer review. Generally at least two scien
tists, selected by the journal's editors, judge the quality and originality of each
paper, recommending whether or not it should be published.
Science publishing was a different game when Watson and Crick submit
ted this paper to Nature. With no formal review process at most journals, edi
those courts, my later focus on the education of judges is presumably less rele
vant. But those courts, too, will be already more interested in the specific type of
peer review with which they are faced, and thus less automatically skeptical of
efforts to obtain discovery into the peer-review process.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, significant parallels exist between
the phenomenon in the context of litigation and similar incentives and responses
in regulatory contexts, in particular in connection with the Endangered Species
Act's requirement that conclusions be based on the "best scientific.., information
available." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006). This requirement has led to a strong
preference for peer-reviewed work and thus, predictably, scholarship designed to
satisfy that very requirement.
40. See David A. Kronick, Peer Review in 18th-Century Scientific Journalism, 263
JAMA 1321 (1990).
41. See Chan, supranote 8, at 116.
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tors usually reached their own decisions on submissions,
seeking advice
42
informally only when they were unfamiliar with a subject.

Today, the peer-review process varies widely. The most common
form is as described above: two (or more) reviewers in a relevant field
reviewing the article and advising the editors as to its value.43 Of
course, the reviewers do not themselves perform the experiments or
primary research to confirm its results, nor do they ordinarily access
the underlying data-the data presented are rarely the raw data; they
have long since been analyzed.44 They instead accept the data as
presented by the authors and that the methods used matched the
methods described, then decide whether the conclusions reached are
appropriate and interesting in the relevant discipline, and whether
45
the methods described were appropriate.
Sometimes the process varies. In a case explored in litigation (and
described in more detail below), the reviewers were not anonymous
(indeed, some were from one author's institution), and the review pro
cess took place in a room with the authors present and an active part
of the discussion. 46 Such an approach is likely more common when
the publisher has all but decided to publish the work and is using the
peer-review process as more of an editing process than a selection
process.
In a handful of cases, journals have begun to use "open peer re
view," where both the identity of the reviewers and the substance of
47
their comments are open; not just to the authors, but to everyone.
This has the potential of mitigating biases, incentivizing thorough re
view, and reducing the possibility of discovery into the peer-review
process discussed below.
42. Exploratorium-Unwinding DNA, Annotated Version of Watson & Crick's A
Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, http://www.exploratorium.edu/origins/
coldspring/ideas/printit.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
43. See Chan, supranote 8.
44. See id. at 120.
45. For a more detailed discussion of questions asked in the peer-review process by
some journals, see JAMA Reviewer Instructions, infra note 52 and accompanying
text.
46. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. This review process, as noted in the
text, involved a book rather than an article, where the review process might prop
erly differ; nonetheless, an opposing expert stated that it was unusual even in
that context.
47. See, e.g., Biology Direct, http://www.biology-direct.com/info/about/ ("Biology Di
rect's key aim is to provide authors and readers ofresearch articles with an alter
native to the traditional model of peer review. This includes making the author
responsible for obtaining reviewers' reports via the journal's Editorial Board;
making the peer-review process open rather than anonymous; and making the
reviewers' reports public, thus increasing the responsibility of the referees and
eliminating sources of abuse in the refereeing process."). Open peer review would
be an option available to journals that seek to avoid discovery into the peer-re
view process. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Occasionally-possibly even frequently-authors suggest potential
reviewers. Especially in particularly specialized subject matters, this
may be a necessity in order to find qualified reviewers. Even if the
authors do not suggest reviewers, the fields may be so small that the
author can guess reviewers' identities with some accuracy.
No matter the structure of the process, the realities of the review
itself can vary widely as well. Peer reviewers are typically active re
searchers themselves with limited time. One article might receive an
hour of review, while another might receive days.4S
The reviewers themselves may have agendas in the field (simply by
being active), and may well have a financial interest affected by the
work.49 With a growing proportion of research being privately funded,
the odds of finding an entirely disinterested researcher-especially in
narrow subject matters-may be slim. Even if the reviewer's interest
is simply a disinclination to endorse an article that questions a view
the reviewer has previously held, rather than a financial stake, it still
presents potential bias.50 And, of course, the reviewer may perceive
the author as a competitor for funding even if the author's view is con
sistent with the reviewer's, so bias may exist whether or not the au
thor and the reviewer agree. 5 1
Precisely what a reviewer is asked to do varies by journal. The
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), for example,
categorizes comments into seven areas of interest: "(1) Decision; (2)
Priority; (3) Specific questions about the manuscript's quality; (4)
Manuscript background information; (5) Remarks to the editor; (6) Re
marks to the author; and (7) Conflict of interest statement for [the
48. Two studies indicate that the average is probably around two to three hours. See
Alfred Yankauer, Who Are the PeerReviewers and How Much Do They Review?,
263 JAMA 1338, 1339 (1990); Stephen Lock & Jane Smith, What do Peer Review
ers Do?, 263 JAMA 1341, 1342 (1990).
49. The interest could be based on a desire for ongoing grants or future employment
as a clinical trial investigator, for example.
The potential for conflict of interest can exist whether or not an individ
ual believes that the relationship affects his or her scientific judgment.
Financial relationships (such as employment, consultancies, stock own
ership, honoraria, paid expert testimony) are the most easily identifiable
conflicts of interest and the most likely to undermine the credibility of
the journal, the authors, and of science itself. However, conflicts can oc
cur for other reasons, such as personal relationships, academic competi
tion, and intellectual passion.
INT'L COMM. OF MED. JOURNAL EDITORS, UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANU
SCRIPTS SUBMITTED TO BIOMEDICAL JOURNALS: WRITING AND EDITING FOR BIOMEDI
CAL PUBLICATION 8 (2006), http://www.icmje.org/icmje.pdf [hereinafter UNIFORM
REQUIREMENTS].

50. Such bias may, in fact, still be financial, but indirectly so, with concerns about
challenges to the reviewer's views reducing available funding.
51. See UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49.
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reviewer]."52 JAMA further cites another paper for advice to review
ers, which suggests, among other things, that the reviewer
should pay close attention to the methods section and understand what the
authors did. Does the study follow a known study design? Did the authors
follow the principles of this design? If you have specific references on methods
should include, it is tremendously helpful
or design that you think the authors
53
to provide that information.

Nature instructs its reviewers (called referees) with the following
primary instructions:
The ideal review should answer the following questions:
" Who will be interested in the paper, and why?
* What are the main claims of the paper and how significant are they?
* Is the paper likely to be one of the five most significant papers published in
the discipline this year?
* How does the paper stand out from others in its field?
" Are the claims novel? If not, which published papers compromise novelty?
* Are the claims convincing? If not, what further evidence is needed?
* Are there other experiments or work that would strengthen the paper
further?
* How much would further work improve it, and how difficult would this be?
Would it take a long time?
* Are the claims appropriately discussed in the context of previous
literature?
* If the manuscript is unacceptable, is the study sufficiently promising to
encourage the authors to resubmit?
" If the manuscript is unacceptable but promising, what specific work is
54
needed to make it acceptable?

The instructions continue:
[I]f
time is available, it is extremely helpful to the editors if referees can ad
vise on the following points:
* Is the manuscript clearly written?
* If not, how could it be made more clear or accessible to nonspecialists?
* Would readers outside the discipline benefit from a schematic of the main
result to accompany publication?
* Could the manuscript be shortened?
* Should the authors be asked to provide supplementary methods or data to
accompany the paper online?
* Have the authors done themselves justice without overselling their
claims?
* Have they been fair in treating previous literature?
* Have they provided sufficient methodological detail that the experiments
could be reproduced?
* Is the statistical analysis of the data sound, and does it conform to the
journal's guidelines?
52. JAMA Reviewer Instructions, http://manuscripts.jama.com/cgi-bin/main.plex?
formtype=display-rev-instructions (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
53. Peter Cummings & Frederick P. Rivara, Reviewing Manuscripts for Archives of
Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, 156 ARCHIVES

PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT

MED. 11, 12 (2002).
54. Authors and Referees @ Nature Publishing Group, Peer-review Policy, http:/
www.nature.com/authors/editorial-policies/peer-review.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2007).
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"

Are the reagents generally available?
" Are there any ethical concerns arising from the use of human or other
55
animal subjects?

Note that the reviewers are expressly requested to discuss method
ology only in the secondary, "[i]f time is available" set of questions.
Presumably, of course, the publication's editorial board can evaluate
methodologies to some extent, especially given the editors' back
grounds. 5 6 Further, problems with methodology could likely come
through in response to some of the first set of questions, in particular
in a discussion of whether the paper is convincing. But the relegation
of methodology, at least expressly, to a second-tier question may be
relevant to evaluating how well peer review can be used to evaluate a
methodology for Daubert purposes, especially considering that
Daubert is about methodology above all else.
The range of activities-all of which can accurately be called "peer
review"-is such that entire conferences have taken place solely about
peer review.57 According to some commentators,
There are thousands of scientific and medical journals in the world ... and
many cannot fill their pages. The resulting seller's market means that a re
searcher can publish even an inadequate article somewhere. Serious and ade
quate publication peer review remains relatively rare. Even adequate
publication peer review is sometimes limited in that the review may involve
only one or two peer reviewers, and even the best reviewers can only identify
58
gross errors in methodology or conclusions.

All of this means, of course, that peer review is not a unitary con
cept, and it is not a universally reliable proxy for reliability; the fact
that an article is peer reviewed is not remotely the final word on its
accuracy and reliability. 59 One need go no further than recent head
lines for evidence of this, as in the case of the Korean stem-cell re
searcher who published his work in none other than Science-work
that turned out to be fraudulent.60 When the stakes are high-as is
55. Id.
56. See Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science, About the Editors, http:/!
www.nature.com/nature/aboutteditors/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
57. See, e.g., Fourth International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publica
tion, http://www.ama-assn.org/public/peer/prc-program200l.htm
(last visited
Jan. 5, 2007). Extensive scholarship exists on the range of peer review, and I
have merely attempted to summarize it. For a lengthier and more detailed sum
mary, see William L. Anderson et al., Daubert's Backwash: Litigation-Generated
Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619, 624 (2001).
58. See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 624.
59. See Chan, supranote 8, at 127-29 (summarizing misconceptions about the relia
bility of conclusions published in peer-reviewed journals).
60. See Gina Kolata, Amid Confusion, Journal Retracts Korean's Stem Cell Paper,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A8; Nicholas Wade, Clone Scientist Relied on Peers
and Korean Pride, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at Al. For a compilation of the
original reports and the magazine's reaction, see Science, Special Online Collec
tion: Hwang et al. and Stem Cell Issues, http://www.sciencemag.org/sciext/
hwang2005/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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true in cutting-edge research with millions of research dollars at
stake, in drug development efforts where a negative study might stop
development of a potential blockbuster medicine, or when millions of
dollars in damages may be in play-the incentives are commensu
rately high for researchers to push the limits of accuracy in providing
data. In such situations, peer reviewers may be unable or unwilling to
test the assertions in a publication, and in fact are, by necessity, una
ble to evaluate underlying data.
III.

THE RATIONALITY OF LITIGANTS AND EXPERTS

So far, we have seen two important facts about peer review: First,
courts like it as a hook to rely upon in making decisions about the
reliability (and thus admissibility) of expert testimony, and second, its
reality varies tremendously. These two facts create opportunities for
litigants discussed in this Part-opportunities that have been taken
by unsurprisingly rational and zealous advocates.
First, it makes the litigants want, in some circumstances, to under
cut the probative value of the fact of peer review. In the context of
litigation, that means taking discovery and calling witnesses at trial.
Litigants have subpoenaed and will continue to subpoena documents,
not just from the litigation experts, but also from publications relied
upon and the reviewers involved in the peer-review process. They also
have deposed, and will continue to depose, those involved with the
process, including editors and reviewers.
Second, it makes litigants seeking to admit expert testimony-es
pecially expert testimony likely to be challenged as unreliable or
novel-want to improve their chances by converting litigation re
search into peer-reviewed published research. I refer to these efforts
as "litigation-driven scholarship." As noted above, when an expert can
cite not just a peer-reviewed article using the methodology in question
but also to a peer-reviewed article reaching the very conclusions to
which he proposes to testify, courts are likely to place some weight on
that fact.
Both of these actions have engendered discomfort in both the scien
tific community and the courts along the lines of that described, in a
different context, in a products liability suit against keyboard manu
facturers in New Jersey based on the plaintiffs carpal tunnel
syndrome:
Science coexists uneasily with litigation's adversary system, as the impera
tives of partisan advocacy coupled with powerful economic incentives often
seem to overwhelm good science. Lawyers, judges, and forensic experts some
times engage in what literature teachers call willing suspension of disbelief.
Scientific propositions that would cause even laymen to gasp in disbelief are
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are the dangers of a legal system al
routinely argued in courts of law. 6Such
1
lowing partisan expert testimony.

Before addressing that discomfort, let us explore exactly what is
happening.
A.

Peering Behind the Peer-Review Curtain: Taking
Discovery

What do I mean when I write of discovery into the peer-review pro
cess? It can take a number of forms, and in this section, I provide
representative examples, starting with one that has received a fair
amount of attention.
In the mid-1990s, a plaintiffs attorney in Louisiana contacted two
well-credentialed historians, Gerald Markowitz of the City University
of New York and David Rosner of Columbia University's Mailman
School of Public Health, regarding the vinyl chloride monomer indus
try. 62 Vinyl chloride is a product used in the production of, among
other things, pipes and hoses.63 At one point, plaintiffs' attorneys
thought it might grow into a massive mass tort. To date, however,
litigation has focused not on the end users but on individuals in the
64
manufacturing process who develop a particular liver cancer.
An employee with that ailment retained the attorney who hired
the historians. 65 In discovery, the defendants (representing a sub
stantial portion of the industry) had produced hundreds of thousands
of pages of documents, and the historians were initially asked to act as
consulting experts in order to create a chronology of industry knowl
edge. 6 6 Their work was primarily focused on the activities of an in
dustry group and not on any particular company. The historians
concluded that the companies conspired to hide the dangers of the
products .67
The historians' research led to two relevant work products. The
first was a largely well-regarded book, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 584 (D.N.J. 1997). Judge Irenas
went on: "Almost a century ago, when the use of hired-gun scientific witnesses
was less common and on shakier evidentiary grounds, Judge-to-be Learned Hand
deplored the growing trend towards the use of partisan scientific opinion testi
mony, deeming it an 'evil in the present system.'" Id. at 584 n.16 (quoting
Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegardingExpert Testi
mony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901)). Obviously, the propriety of partisan ex
perts is well beyond the scope of this Article, but the discomfort with that concept
is similar to the discomfort with the phenomena discussed herein.
See Alexander Lane, Tempestuous Times in the Ivory Tower, NEWARK STAR
LEDGER, Dec. 5, 2004, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Politicsof IndustrialPollution, published by the University of Califor
nia Press and the Milbank Fund.68 The book explored the lead and
vinyl chloride industries. The book explores industry knowledge of
dangers of the product and its manufacturing process, and the indus
try's response (or lack thereof) to those dangers. One chapter focuses
on the vinyl chloride industry. As noted above, the authors concluded
that the industry possessed and conspired to cover up material evi
dence regarding the dangers of its product. The material in the book
relating to the vinyl chloride industry was based largely, if not en
tirely, on documents reviewed as the historians' work as paid consult
69
ing experts.
The second work product was an expert report (with only Professor
Markowitz's signature) provided to the plaintiffs' attorneys in antici
pation of deposition and trial testimony:
I have been asked to review the history of the vinyl chloride industry to under
stand and analyze what they [sic] discovered about the health hazards of vinyl
chloride, what the industry's response was to information about vinyl chlo
ride's toxicity, and what the industry did with the information and knowledge
that they [sic] acquired.
Specifically, I was asked my opinion of whether the vinyl chloride industry
forthrightly furnished information to the United States government and its
responsible agencies, whether it forthrightly furnished information to the
public, and whether it forthrightly furnished information to the people
who
70
worked in the vinyl industry's plants. It is my opinion that it did not.

68. GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS
OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002). For a selection of book reviews, see Deceitand
Denial.org Book Reviews, http://www.deceitanddenial.org/reviews/ (last visited
Jan. 5, 2007).
69. As I note below, this work could potentially be classified as "litigation-driven
scholarship" as well as being an example of discovery into the peer-review pro
cess. It is not clear, however, that the historians' scholarly work was produced
with an eye to litigation; at the time of the book's writing, it is possible that the
authors were only retained as consulting witnesses. Additionally, there are sig
nificant questions about whether this subject is properly the basis of expert testi
mony at all, or if it is rather an effort to have a single well-credentialed witness
telling the story of the opponent's bad documents. That, however, is beyond the
scope ofthis Article and will be the subject ofa future article. See generallyPatri
cia Cohen, History for Hire in Industry Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at
B7 (noting disagreement among historians as to whether testifying in public
health endangerment cases is appropriate). Also of note, Markowitz and Rosner
have served as expert witnesses in lead-paint litigation as well. See Gerald Mar
kowitz & David Rosner, DeceitandDenial.org Purpose, http://www.deceitandde
nial.org/purpose/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (noting the authors' involvement in
the Rhode Island nuisance lawsuit); see also Eric Tucker, Public Health Expert
Testifies in Lead Paint Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2005, at Al (describing
Markowitz's testimony in a Massachusetts lead-paint case). I am unaware of any
comparable discovery being taken in the lead-paint litigation.
70. Gerald Markowitz, Expert Report on the Vinyl Chloride Industry (May 19, 2004)
(on file with author).
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The report attached a 251-page chronology that provided substan
tially more detail on the actions than the expert report itself did.71
The chronology and report tracked Deceit and Denial fairly closely,
and, based on the discovery sought, the defendants appear to have an
ticipated that the fact of Deceit and Denial's publication and peer re
view would be important in the court's evaluation of Professor
72
Markowitz's proffered testimony.
Attorneys for the defendants sought to take discovery into the pro
cess by which Deceit and Denial was published-particularly into the
peer-review process. They served document subpoenas, seeking corre
spondence and the like, on the Milbank Memorial Fund and the Uni
versity of California. 7 3 They also subpoenaed several participants in
the process, including five of the eight actual reviewers, asking,
among other things, how they were selected as reviewers and what the
review included. 7 4 The specific results of that discovery, whatever
they might have been, are publicly unknown; the case settled in Feb
ruary 2006 and the motions in limine regarding Markowitz did not
75
address the methodology or otherwise disclose what was learned.
We do know that one of the defendants' experts, history professor
Philip Scranton of Rutgers, opined that (among other things) Marko
witz and Rosner acted unethically in participating in an "open" peerreview process (described earlier):
Markowitz ...admitted that he knew the Milbank Foundation reviewers for
[the book] and had coauthored publications with some of them. Indeed, not
only did Markowitz join in selecting the manuscript's referees; he chose sev
eral faculty members from his own institution to evaluate the draft.
Such practices subverted confidential, objective refereeing of scholarly manu
scripts (singleor double-blind), for this review was largely done "among
76
friends."

The discovery into peer review (and Scranton's report) received na
tional attention, including articles in The Chronicle of Higher Educa
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.

76.

Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, Deceit and Denial Chronology (2002),
http://www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/timeline.pdf.
While articles and books may have different processes for peer review, in this
instance the publisher did subject the book to a peer-review process, and I as
sume, I think reasonably, that if the reviewers had recommended rejection of the
book, or recommended changes that the authors refused, publication would not
have gone forward. Regardless of the differences, the issues in taking discovery
into the processes are similar if not identical.
Lane, supra note 62.
Id.
Gulf Oil Corp.'s Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Historian, Gerald Marko
witz, and For Other Relief, Spann v. Airco, Inc., No. 3:02cv1645WS (S.D. Miss.
Feb. 10, 2006).
Philip Scranton, Expert Report on Gerald Markowitz's Work (Aug. 3, 2004), http:/
/www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/Scranton.pdf. I should note that I do not necessa
rily agree with Professor Scranton's views of Professor Markowitz's work.
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tion77 and The Nation.78 Both included suggestions by the experts
and others that the discovery was part of an effort to intimidate or
silence industry critics-to scare future experts off of testifying con
trary to the industry's wishes. In the Chronicle of Higher Education
story, the head of the university press, Lynne Withey, is quoted as
describing the discovery as "disturbing" and "pretty sleazy on [the de
fendants'] part."7 9 The historians created a substantial website
presenting similar views, calling the actions "highly unusual, if un
precedented, intrusions into the academic peer-review process."80
Efforts to obtain discovery from the peer-review process are not, in
fact, unprecedented. In one case, a court rejected a "scholar's privi
lege" when faced with discovery into the peer-review process.8 1 Simi
larly, in the breast implant litigation, the editor-in-chief of the New
England Journalof Medicine was served with a subpoena seeking in
formation about the publication of a relevant article.8 2
The converse can take place as well, with the fact that an expert's
theory failed the peer-review process becoming part of Daubert or
other arguments. For example, in a case involving a purported epide
miological study8 3 of illnesses near a Kerr McGee plant, the defend
ants obtained the comments of peer reviewers who recommended
rejection of the study. Those comments were used to bolster the defen
dant's criticisms of the study:
The Plaintiffs' Report was rejected by the journal to which it was submitted.
That journal, Occupationaland EnvironmentalMedicine, has provided [Kerr
McGee] with the notes of the reviewers assigned to evaluate the Report.
One reviewer lodged the same criticisms that [Kerr McGee] sets out in its
motion and brief. Her first note raises the problem of selection bias, and ques
tions the 'internal validity" of the Report. She then asks whether researchers
and interviewers were blinded to the status of the study subjects. They were
77. Lila Guterman, Peer Reviewers are Subpoenaed in Cancer Lawsuit Against
Chemical Companies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 19, 2004, at A20.
78. See Wiener, supra note 4.
79. Guterman, supra note 77. On the other hand, one of the peer reviewers, David
Kotelchuck, said that apart from having received the subpoena at home at 11:45
p.m., he did not feel harassed by it. He said the industry "wishes to defend it
self ... . It's perfectly reasonable for them to want to speak to people who have
some information about the evidence." Id.
80. Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 71.
81. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
82. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 142-46 (1996).

83. According to the motion to exclude testimony based on the study, the researcher
used as the "exposed" population a list of "plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs" pro
vided to him by the plaintiffs' attorney, while the "control" group was recruited
from church attendees. The participants were not blinded in any way, among
other potentially problematic methodologies. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defend
ants' Motion to Exclude Use or Reference to Plaintiffs' Report at 10, Andrews v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 2001 WL 1704150 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2001) (No. 1:00CV158
D-A).
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not. She wonders whether the questionnaires were designed specifically for
this Report. They were not. Continuing, the reviewer points out that state
ments in the introduction and discussion "are not backed up by data in the
study." "This," she says, "is not acceptable for publication." Finally, address
ing the Report's conclusions, she writes: "The discussion makes conclusions
that are not fully supported by the data.... The poor internal validity of this
study does not allow the final conclusionsto be made .. ."84

I include the full discussion to point out that careful peer reviewers
are often asking precisely the questions that a court applying Daubert
should be applying:
* Is this a sound methodology?
• Are the conclusions supported by the data?
" Is it acceptable in the field?
And when peer review is done properly-as it appears to have been
in the Kerr McGee case 5-it can be a powerful basis for either ap
proval or rejection of the methodology in court as well as in publishing
decisions, and is appropriately considered highly useful in determin
ing the reliability of a methodology.8 6 But when it is not done well, its
status as an indicator for reliability is highly questionable.
Outside of the peer-review process, litigants sometimes seek dis
covery into underlying data-for example, data files or interview
notes. Such discovery is most potentially concerning when the re
searcher involved has no connection to the litigation, and is less di
rectly related to the Daubertprocess and is more related to an attempt
87
to directly undercut or reevaluate the research.
If the specifics of the peer review in a particular case are poten
tially relevant to a court's evaluation of expert testimony, then why
might there be a problem at all with taking discovery into that pro
cess? The details will come later, but for now, the core challenge to
such discovery is a fear of intimidation and of chilling participation in
the process, and of harm to academic freedom. Whether the litigants
intend it or not, the specter of becoming involved in litigation-which
84. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Report at 5-6,
Andrews v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 2001 WL 1704150 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2001) (No.
1:00CV158-D-A) (citations omitted).
85. Of course, the plaintiffs defended the study. Id.
86. Sometimes the peer reviewers reject scholarship because the scholar has failed to
clearly explain the results, rather than any flaw with the results themselves. As
suming that the basis for the rejection is clear, such a rejection should have no
impact on the Daubert analysis.
87. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas and the Sociology of Knowl
edge, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1996) (discussing knowledge areas in which
judges need education on scientific practices to effectively evaluate subpoenaed
research materials); see also Rebecca Emily Rapp, In re Cusumano and the Un
due Burden of Using the JournalistPrivilegeas a Model for ProtectingResearch
ers from Discovery, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 265 (2000) (discussing a First Circuit case, In
re Cusumano v. Microsoft, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998), which extended the jour
nalist privilege to third-party researchers).
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is undeniably at minimum a hassle and at maximum highly disrup
tive and expensive-has the potential to make potential peer review
ers hesitate before agreeing to take part in the process, especially if
the litigation removes anonymity that had previously been promised
the reviewers. Further, if it is permitted on demand, without special
standards or controls, litigants may indeed recognize and take the op
portunity to chill the participation of skilled researchers and thus slow
the development of science. Any approach to this issue must at least
consider these concerns. Markowitz and Rosner themselves summa
rized the concerns well, describing the defendants' efforts as "attempts
by the chemical industry to shut down discussion of their past and to
interfere with the peer-review process, academic freedom and open debate."8 8 They continue:
Should the peer review process be subject to industry-sponsored subpoenas?
Should we worry about being brought in for depositions if we review a "contro
versial" book? Would we work on controversial subjects at all if industry law
yers are able to get at our notes, our documents and even our colleagues?
Would we feel free to research these topics if we knew that industry can hire
fellow historians to devote months to pick through footnotes and develop so
phistic (not sophisticated) arguments meant to undermine colleagues' profes
sional credibility and integrity? Should we be concerned that reviewers may
decide to avoid participating in the review process if they know that industry
lawyers can later order them into court proceedings? These are certainly is
8 9
sues that should be discussed.

B. You Want Peer Review? We'll Get Peer Review:
Litigation-Driven Scholarship
As courts' consideration of expert testimony becomes more focused
on judging reliability based on the presence or absence of peer review
of the principles, methodology, and conclusions, litigants (and their
experts) have seen an opportunity to improve their chances by ob
taining peer review themselves-often by submitting something very
similar to the litigation expert report to a peer-reviewed journal in
hopes of getting it published. Again, some examples may help.
Perhaps the most striking example came in litigation against DuPont relating to alleged birth defects resulting from fungicide expo
sure. 90 In that case, the plaintiffs' attorneys paid for a series of
88. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, The Chemical Industry's Attack on Histori
ans, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2004), http://hnn.us/articles/8730.html.
89. Id. In the context of discovery into uninvolved researchers, Jasanoff states that
the efforts "may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations."
Jasanoff, supranote 87, at 97. "Litigants may try to use the research subpoena to
intimidate and overburden researchers or to introduce irrelevant and confusing
issues into the fact-finding process." Id. But they may also "expect to find genu
ine discrepancies between the 'facts' reported by scientists and the observations
on which their findings were based." Id.
90. See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 624-25.
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studies, with one of the studies costing at least $200,000.91 The paid
expert "discussed two of the tests with the lead researcher (his col
league at the same university), provided samples of the fungicide, and
assisted in the design and interpretation of the studies."9 2 One study,
which supported the assertions of the paid experts, was published in
the peer-reviewed journal NeuroToxicology without any conflict disclo
sure (and none, evidently, was
required). 9 3 The other studies were not
94
submitted for publication.
An example not involving new studies relates to the anti-choles
terol drug Baycol (cerivastatin), which was voluntarily withdrawn
from the market on August 8, 2001, by its manufacturer, Bayer Corpo
ration. 95 Over 10,000 lawsuits, most of them alleging various muscle
injuries, were eventually filed, with the federal multidistrict litigation
eventually reaching the third largest federal multidistrict litigation to
date. As has become common in mass tort litigation, attorneys for
both sides retained experts in many areas, including the obvious sub
jects of general and specific causation, but also subjects such as medi
cal and corporate ethics, with experts opining on the appropriateness
of the company's actions based on knowledge at various times.
The first two trials, both in early 2003, ended in defense verdicts
(as did all trials to date). Later, three paid experts retained by plain
tiffs' attorneys in the litigation published an article in the Journalof
the American Medical Association discussing Bayer's actions in con
nection with the medication. The article largely tracked the opinions
given as paid expert witnesses by the authors and disclosed their role
as plaintiffs' experts while stating that the article was based only on
public information. 9 6 To date, those authors have not appeared in any
Baycol trials, though they have been designated as experts since then.
91. Id. at 624 n.24.
92. Id. at 624.
93. See id. at 624-25; see also W.G. McLean et al., The Effect of Benomyl on Neurite
Outgrowth in Mouse NB2A and Human SH-SY5Y NeuroblastomaCells In Vitro,
19 NEURoToxIcOLOGY 629 (1998) (containing no reference to the authors' involve
ment with related litigation).
94. See Anderson et al., supranote 57, at 624. As of the date of the Anderson article,
the plaintiffs' expert had been excluded in at least two matters. See id. at 624
n.21.
95. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Talk Paper, Bayer Voluntarily With
draws Baycol (Aug. 8, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2001V
ANS01095.html. In private practice, I worked as one of Bayer's attorneys in the
Baycol litigation and continue to do a minimal amount of consulting work in the
litigation.
96. Bruce M. Psaty et al., Potentialfor Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Sus
pected Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatinand Risk of Rhabdomyolysis,
292 JAMA 2622, 2630 (2004) [hereinafter Psaty et al., Potentialfor Conflict]. In
the same issue, Bayer's response (authored by Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., D.O.,
J.D., M.P.H., who served as Bayer's counsel) to Psaty et al. was published, as was
an alternative view authored by Brian L. Strom, M.D., M.P.H., of the University
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The Kerr McGee case cited above is perhaps the most typical case
of litigation-driven scholarship. 9 7 The report in question there was
clearly created in connection with litigation-indeed, the "exposed"
population was identified by the plaintiffs' firm itself, obviously creat
ing enormous potential for selection bias. If not for the fact of the re
tention of the experts, those studies would almost certainly not have
occurred.
Litigation-driven scholarship is not, to be sure, limited to plaintiffs'
experts. A 1992 Ohio asbestos case discussed the admissibility of an
article written by one of the defendant's experts:
The article was written by defendant's expert, Dr. Corn, with fifteen other
scientists. Dr. Corn compiled and analyzed air sampling tests conducted in
seventy-one school buildings across the country which contained asbestos
materials. The expert concluded that the levels of asbestos fibers in the air
inside the schools were not higher than the levels in air outside the schools,
and, therefore no incremental health risk from asbestos existed in these build
ings. The article was submitted for peer review before publication in the sci
entific journal [Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology].9 8

The expert acknowledged that the data he used came from other court
cases in which he was involved as an expert, but stated that he pre
pared the article as a researcher, not as an expert witness. 99 The
court admitted the testimony.1 0 0
This incentive to create scholarship may result in the publication
of whole new areas of purported expertise that have not previously
been published and that may not genuinely be properly the subject of
expert testimony-scientists opining about the ethics of defendants,
for example. 10 1 The potential for bias is, of course, obvious:

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

of Pennsylvania (who had served as an expert witness for Bayer). Joseph D. Pior
kowski, Jr., Bayer's Response to "Potentialfor Conflict of Interest in the Evalua
tion of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of
Rhabdomyolysis," 292 JAMA 2655, 2657 (2004); Brian L. Strom, Potential for
Conflict of Interest in the Evaluationof Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions, 292 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2643, 2645 (2004). The issue also included a Journalofthe Amer
ican Medical Association editorial on the subject and a reply from Psaty et al.
Bruce M. Psaty et al., Authors'Reply to Bayer's Response to "Potentialfor Conflict
of Interest in the Evaluation ofSuspected Adverse DrugReactions: Use of Cerivas
tatin and Risk of Rhabdomyolysis," 292 JAMA 2658 (2004) [hereinafter Psaty et
al., Authors'Reply]. All authors' involvement as counsel or experts was disclosed,
though no authors disclosed the amounts they had been paid in the litigation.
See Piorkowski, Jr., supra;Psaty et al., Authors' Reply, supra, at 2659; Psaty et
al., Potentialfor Conflict, supra; Strom, supra.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Worthington City Schs. v. Abco Insulation, 616 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992).
See id.
See id.
The propriety of this sort of expert is beyond the scope of this Article. Briefly,
though, my basic concern with such testimony is not Daubert-relatedas such, but
instead has to do with whether the testimony aids the jury. Thus, for example, I
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[Tihe reliability and accuracy of litigation-based research is likely to be
viewed with suspicion because of the potential bias arising from the source of
funding for the research and the relationship between the researchers and the
lawyers. Pressures resulting from the need to have the "right" outcome may
result in manipulated procedures, distorted data, selective reporting of re
sults, or even falsified outcomes.102

It is no surprise, given the incentives created by Daubert and the
Federal Rules' implementation of Daubert, that litigation-driven
scholarship has developed.1 03 Nor is it surprising, as noted earlier,
that discovery into peer review is perhaps on the upswing. In the next
Part, I consider whether either of these developments is necessarily
problematic.
IV. HOW SCIENCE AND LAW CAN STRENGTHEN
EACH OTHER
Expert witnesses are allowed to testify if they are able to, among
other things, "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 10 4 The goal of their testimony, therefore,
must be to explain why a disputed allegation is either more or less
likely to be true. In order to evaluate any testimony, a court or jury
considers the basis of the testimony-the data on which it is based, to
put it another way-and the reasonableness of the witness's
conclusions.
This process-questioning the premises, the methods, the reasona
bleness-tracks in large part the process used in evaluating scientific
research.10 5 The post-publication evaluation of research, whether by

102.
103.

104.
105.

certainly can see the value of an attorney hiring a historian to prepare a chronol
ogy of documents and events that supports a particular interpretation of the facts
of a case. But once that chronology is completed, I believe a jury can ordinarily
reach the conclusions on its own, and that presenting a purported expert to tell
the story is potentially improperly placing what should be an attorney's closing
argument in the middle of the trial. As noted earlier, see supra note 69, I will
address these issues in a future article.
Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 621.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit (prior to the Supreme Court's Daubert decision) noted
that a lack of peer review is often a problem with litigation-driven scholarship.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Scientific studies conducted in anticipation of litigation must be scrutinized
much more carefully than studies conducted in the normal course of scientific
inquiry. This added dose of skepticism is warranted, in part, because studies
generated especially for use in litigation are less likely to have been exposed to
the normal peer review process, which is one of the hallmarks of reliable scien
tific investigation.").
FED. R. EVID. 702.
See supraPart II. I do not suggest that the litigation process and its adversarial
nature are the same as peer review, only that there is substantial overlap. Cf.
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE

BAR:

LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN

AMERICA 8 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) ("[The cultures of law and science are in
fact mutually constitutive in ways that have previously escaped systematic anal
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replicating it or building on it, is a critical part of the progress of sci
ence. 10 6 Indeed, this post-publication evaluation is probably more im
portant than the publication peer review that courts (and this Article)
focus on.
Such a searching examination of research is highly effective at
eventually ferreting out bad research, and that conclusion is the pre
mise of two key conclusions: First, science and law have numerous
checks already in place to catch bad research, and so courts need not
automatically reject litigation-driven scholarship. Second, those same
checks are strengthened and complemented, especially in the context
of litigation-driven scholarship, by permitting discovery into the peerreview process. I address each in turn.
A.

Why Courts Should Not Exclude All Litigation-Driven
Scholarship

Under Daubert and Rule 702, the trial judge makes a threshold
determination of reliability leaving the ultimate conclusion of credibil
ity and probative value to the jury. For the same reason that judges
instruct juries that they are entitled to consider the financial interest
of a witness in determining the witness's credibility, the fact that a
particular item of research was performed and published by a paid
litigation witness (whether paid by the plaintiff or defendant) is, of
course, relevant to consideration of its credibility. The source of the
funding is relevant just as the funding of clinical trials by pharmaceu
tical companies is relevant to the evaluation of those studies because
the funding of research demonstrably can affect its outcomes.10 7
To put it mildly, such bias likely exists in work performed by ex
perts in litigation; it is highly unusual for a party's retained expert to
testify contrary to the party's litigation position. Though experts are
generally precluded from working for a contingent fee, 0 8 attorneys
undoubtedly consider their success in obtaining verdicts in their favor
in deciding whether to rehire experts, so even when publishing an ar
ticle nominally separate from their litigation work, the authors of liti
gation-driven (or even merely litigation-related) scholarship do have a
financial interest in the outcome of the research. The conflict of inter
ysis.... [T]hese institutions jointly produce our social and scientific knowledge
106. See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 628-29.
107. See generally Frank Davidoffet al., Sponsorship,Authorship, andAccountability,
345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 825 (2001), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/
content/full/345/11/825.
108. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) cmt. 3 (2003) ("The common
law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to... pay an expert witness a
contingent fee.").
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est is at least as real as in the context where research is funded by, for
example, a pharmaceutical company.
An additional reason to be skeptical of litigation-driven scholarship
arises from the timelines of scientists as compared the timelines of
lawyers. Science (and academic research more generally) tends to be
incremental, where it can take years to develop a body of research that
addresses a hypothesis.1 0 9 The ongoing review of conclusions by col
leagues and competitors takes time, as theories are considered, tested,
and discarded, revised, or confirmed. Litigation necessarily moves
faster: statutes of limitations run; witnesses forget, move, or die;
plaintiffs want a recovery; defendants want a resolution; and attor
neys want their fees, whether hourly or contingent. In most lawsuits,
the expert's opinion (and thus, if relevant here, the litigation-driven
research) is a one-time event, with at most minor changes as the case
progresses. Even if the work receives publication peer review, it may
not receive the ongoing review of peers (at least during the relevant
litigation time period), and so it has not been genuinely tested. 110
Further, litigants demand firm conclusions and an expert's com
mitment to those conclusions. For a testifying expert, "probably" is
not a good answer very often. In contrast, the incremental nature of
much scientific research requires hints, false starts, ideas that fail,
and good guesses all along the process.
That said, just as medical journals and courts do not automatically
reject studies paid for by drug sponsors or reject the first study in a
particular area, the fact that research is done in the context of litiga
tion does not mean it should automatically be excluded, either from
journals or evidence in trial. Rule 702, indeed, provides that the liti
gation origin of research should be considered a factor, but only a fac
tor, in evaluating expert testimony. 1 ' Many questions of interest to
public health (or other important policies) may only be evaluated in
the context of litigation. In cases where a product has been with
drawn or recalled, for example, there is no well-funded group other
than attorneys who have an interest in learning more about the prod
uct. If paid litigation experts do not perform certain research, it may
well not be done at all-and the financial interest in the outcome is
not significantly different for attorneys than for sponsoring companies
paying for studies of their products. This is likely the most obvious in
mass tort litigation, where nobody besides attorneys has any incentive
to fund ongoing research into withdrawn products; but that research
may provide useful information for future products, and those attor
neys can have hundreds of thousands of dollars available for perform
109. See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 630-31.
110. See id.
111. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment.
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ing the research, whether it is original research or a post-hoc
1 12
evaluation of a combination of clinical trials.
Put briefly, we trust scholarly journals, and juries, to be able to
evaluate the weight that should be given to the bias in financial sup
port in other contexts. That trust should extend to judges' abilities to
evaluate the reliability of methodology in a Daubert analysis and to
juries' abilities to consider the relevancy of potential bias-at least
enough to identify bias as one factor rather than a per se basis for
exclusion. One can quite reasonably argue that we ought not be ask
ing juries (or even judges) to be evaluating science at all; such an ar
gument counsels in favor of systems of health courts and the like. But
if judges and juries are to be evaluating science at all, they will be
considering scholarship with the potential of bias, and we ought to
trust them to consider that bias as well as they consider other biases.
Additionally, serious scholars have substantial reasons to self-reg
ulate to avoid the scorn of colleagues or, perhaps more problematic, a
published court decision declaring them unreliable or dishonest. Rep
utation is, in many respects, the coin of the realm in academia, though
in some cases that coin may well be traded for the more literal coin of
retention as a paid expert. While it obviously is not a panacea, danger
to reputation (a danger that may threaten future expert retentions)
helps balance the risks of accepting litigation-driven scholarship.
Finally, the availability of discovery into the peer-review process
itself (discussed in the next section) helps mitigate the potential harm
of litigation-driven scholarship. Attorneys can learn about numerous
subjects potentially relevant to the Daubert decision (and to the fact
finder's evaluation of the expert's credibility):
* What was the nature of the peer review (anonymous, open, one
reviewer, expertise of reviewer)?
" How long did the reviewers take to review the piece?
* Did the reviewers know that the authors had a financial interest in
the outcome?
* Did the reviewers or editors have a financial interest in the out
come of the litigation?
* Were the reviewers acquainted or friendly with the author?
* Did the author exploit personal connections with the editors or
reviewers?
" Is the journal or publisher involved well regarded?
" Do they have an interest in the outcome of the litigation?
Thus, especially with liberal discovery available to litigants to fully
develop the potential biases or other problems with the research, liti
gation-driven scholarship should not be rejected strictly because it
112. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which plaintiffs'
attorneys spent $200,000 on a single study).
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comes out of litigation. That fact does not sufficiently distinguish it
from other scholarship that is published and admitted daily in reputa
ble journals and in courts.
B.

Why Courts Should Allow Some Discovery into Peer
Review

The potential value of litigation-driven scholarship is not terribly
controversial; after all, most of the examples cited above were pub
lished, some in prestigious journals. The practice of litigants taking
discovery into the peer-review process, however, appears more broadly
disturbing. In this section, I argue that the concerns with such discov
ery, should lead us to regulate, not bar, the practice. Taking discovery
into peer review offers an opportunity for litigants and courts to better
evaluate the resulting scholarship and to know how much weight to
put on the fact of peer review. Additionally, this discovery process has
the salutary effect of educating judges about the realities of peer re
view, discussed above, giving them a better foundation for Daubert
and related decisions. I address the reasons in the following three
subsections.
1.

The Possibility of Subpoenas and Depositions Helps Counter
Bad Litigation-DrivenScholarship

As noted above, the availability of discovery into the peer-review
process can provide real assistance in balancing the realities of litiga
tion-driven scholarship. The adversarial system is not unique to law;
it is in fact a critical part of science, and adding to it can strengthen it.
As Nobel Laureate in Medicine Georg Von B~k6sy put it:
[One] way of dealing with errors is to have friends who are willing to spend
the time necessary to carry out a critical examination of the experimental de
sign beforehand and the results after the experiments have been completed.
An even better way is to have an enemy. An enemy is willing to devote a vast
amount of time and brain power to ferreting out errors both large and small,
and this without any compensation. The trouble is that really capable enemies
are scarce; most of them are only ordinary. Another trouble with enemies is
that they sometimes develop into friends and lose a good deal of their zeal. It
was in this way the writer lost his three best enemies. Everyone, not just
scientists, need a few good enemies! 1 13
113. Von Bdkdsy's statement, originally at GEORG VON BigKsY, EXPERIMENTS IN HEAR
ING 8-9 (E.G. Wever ed. & trans., 1960), was quoted in George A. Olah's Nobel
Lecture in 1994. See George A. Olah, Nobel Lecture, My Search for Carbocations
and Their Role in Chemistry (Dec. 8, 1994), available at http://nobelprize.org/
chemistry/laureates/1994/olah-lecture.pdf. This "enemy" concept likely has par
ticular strength in the context of dramatic changes in a field, such as Crick and
Watson's paper. If their assertions had been disproved, their careers would have
been at least seriously injured, if not ended.
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Except for the absence of compensation, someone who "is willing to
devote a vast amount of time and brain power to ferreting out errors
both large and small" sounds a lot like a devoted attorney preparing
for a cross-examination. But attorneys can do even more than even
"really capable enemies" in the sciences can do-lawyers can compel
document production and testimony and find not just large and small
errors, but flaws in the publication process itself.
Consider the following questions: How often would a competing re
searcher challenge the method used in peer review? How often would
a competing researcher demand access to the underlying research, to
the extent of wanting to (and being allowed to) reinterview subjects of
a study? How often could they demand an opportunity to spend hours
asking the peer reviewer about the review and obtain copies of the
comments of the reviewers? How often could they bring the court's
power of subpoena to bear? How often would they have the money
available to do those interviews and hire a consulting expert to pains
takingly evaluate the work? The answer, of course, is "virtually
never" to every one of the questions. As suggested by Von B~k~sy's
speech, science already is reliant on an adversarial system; allowing
lawyers into it is an extension and expansion of the same. It may be
uncomfortable, but it is not new.
Sheila Jasanoff, writing in the context of subpoenas to researchers
who do not have a connection to the litigation in issue, disputes the
ability of courts "to distinguish between valid and invalid scientific
claims," arguing that the expectation rests on "questionable assump
tions about the practice of science."1 1 4 Those assumptions are as set
forth below:

"

that evidence of fraud, error, and poor scientific practice can be detected
unambiguously from written records;
" that challenged methodologies (including methods of analysis and inter
pretation) clearly conform or do not conform to "scientific" standards;
* that such standards preexist and hence can be mechanically applied dur
ing legal inquiry; and
" that the adversarial process is conducive to sorting out disputes concern
115
ing the validity and reliability of competing research practices.

Jasanoff argues that those assumptions are inconsistent with, if not
116
contradicted by, modern thought about the sociology of science.
While this argument does counsel in favor of caution when al
lowing wide-ranging discovery into nonparty research, in fact it sup
ports the availability of certain peer-review discovery because it will
permit litigants to explore the very ambiguities in science that Jasa
noff identifies, and because it will assist in educating the courts about
the limitations of science. Those courts may well still make declara
114. Jasanoff, supra note 87, at 97.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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tions that suggest a belief in scientific certainty, but the more they
learn about the scientific process, the more that claimed certainty will
be a useful fiction rather than oversimplifying. Put another way, a
necessary assumption of practicing law is that a fact can be estab
lished, while a foundation of science is that all purported facts can be
challenged. Courts that expect final answers from science are being
unrealistic, and opening the black box of peer review will help reveal
the reality while permitting courts to do a better job of reaching final
legal answers. Thus, rather than using a lack of understanding of sci
ence to rationalize keeping litigants and courts out of it, we should
recognize peer-review discovery as a way to improve that
understanding.
2.

The Possibility of Subpoenas and Depositions Provides
Incentives to Do the Research and the PeerReview
Correctly

Researchers quite reasonably lament the possibility of being de
posed.'1 7 Depositions are unpleasant experiences, presumably even
more so when being done with the aim of undercutting the validity of
one's scholarly work. But having to face that possibility may create
additional incentives to strive for better research and better peer re
view. Peer reviewers, properly, do not generally examine the underly
ing documents, data, etc. on which scholarly research is based, and so
researchers may feel somewhat safe in using fudged data. When the
stakes are sufficiently high, cross-examining attorneys will often do
exactly what peer reviewers do not (as well as what they do).
Having such detailed scrutiny as even a remote possibility may de
crease the likelihood of scholars using any sleight of hand. And that
possibility becomes ever more remote when the research is genuinely
above reproach. Similarly, if the peer-review process is demonstrably
solid-demonstrable through correspondence and notes, which can be
produced with relatively little difficulty-the likelihood of a deposition
shrinks, as there is little potential value.11S
117. See Wiener, supranote 4, at 21 ("Academics aren't used to being 'commanded' to
do anything, and are unlikely to have attorneys of their own to accompany them
to depositions."). In describing the depositions involved in Deceit and Denial,
Wiener writes:
Cook's deposition took only an hour, but it was "an hour ofbattering and
legal tricks, and the goal was to trip you up and get you confused," she
said. "They kept asking me how long I had known Gerry Markowitz. I
said, 'Are you asking if I had an affair?' They said, 'No, why are you
asking that?' I said, 'Where I come from, that's the implication of your
question.' They said, 'Where do you come from?'"
Id. I admit to being uncertain how asking how long a witness had known a prof
fered expert constitutes either battering or a legal trick.
118. This point may be moderately naive. I am aware that many depositions are
taken without any real hope of getting something useful. The percentage that fit
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This point remains applicable whether or not the research in ques
tion is litigation-driven, or in fact whether or not the expert witness
was involved in the research in question. If the expert is relying on
peer-reviewed research that he did not perform, the opponents of the
expert's testimony may well have a legitimate reason to explore the
validity of that research, though, as I note below, the burden to show
the propriety of the discovery may appropriately be greater.
3.

Discovery into the Peer-Review Process Opens the Black Box
of Peer Review and Educates the Courts

Some commentators have looked at the decade-plus of experience
with Daubert and concluded that the shift in focus has had relatively
minor effects on the outcome of cases, but, importantly, that it has
educated judges about the realities of science.' 1 9 By providing judges
factors to consider, the argument goes, judges will learn more about
how those factors relate to reliability and how scientists think about
the issues. Similarly, allowing discovery into peer-review processes
will inform judges about the realities of those processes, and the many
forms that those processes take, as described above.
In lay press coverage of the Deceit and Denial depositions, the re
viewers and others focused on the perceived oddity of the attorneys
asking the reviewers if they had checked all of the footnotes. 120 This
focus misses the point. The point of the questions was almost cer
tainly not to show that the reviewers failed in their job, but rather to
point out the limitations of that job and thus of the endorsement, as
suggested earlier. If the defendants could later show that those foot
notes were not, in fact, accurate, then the reviewers' recommendation
of publication could reasonably be called into question, not necessarily
because they did not do their job, but because facts on which they (rea
sonably) relied were inaccurate.' 2 ' Such a showing would lead the
courts involved to learn more about what peer reviewers actually do.
We have already seen that some judges have an oversimplified
view of the realities of peer review. Through allowing discovery into
peer review, judges will learn through seeing the outcome of that disthat description rises as the stakes rise. As noted below, I do have some sugges
tions to deter fishing expeditions, including the possibility of a judge appointing
an expert to evaluate the request to take discovery into the peer-review process.
119. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards,91 VA. L.

REV.

471, 474 (2005).

120. See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21 ("The prevailing practice at university presses is
that manuscript reviewers are not expected to check footnotes; Lynne Withey,
director ofthe University ofCalifornia Press, asked, 'How could you expect people
to do that?"').
121. See, e.g., Jennifer Couzin, Stem Cells:And How the Problems Eluded Peer Re
viewers andEditors, SCIENCE, Jan. 6, 2006, at 23 (Science's editor-in-chief Donald
Kennedy says that "[p]eer review cannot detect [fraud] if it is artfully done").
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covery that peer review is not binary, but instead a spectrum, and will
be better able to evaluate scholarship that is presented to them as
peer reviewed, and better able to determine its reliability and
admissibility.
V. PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING POTENTIAL HARM
The reasons I have suggested for developing a level of comfort with
discovery into the peer-review process and with litigation-driven
scholarship are all related, and they relate to the goals of Daubert, a
recognition that law and science, while having substantial differences,
have overlapping magisteria. "The net of science covers the empirical
universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way (the
ory)." 12 2 Similarly, law-as it relates to expert testimony-has to do
with facts (what the expert tells the factfinder jury it should conclude)
and theory (why the jury should do so). The relevant criteria for eval
uating those asserted facts and theories should largely line up.
Scientists (theoretically) welcome challenges from sources within
their magisterium, whether by way of competing publications, chal
lenges in the peer-review process, revisions in the publication process,
or otherwise. They should not automatically reject similar challenges
from an overlapping magisterium, law, simply because they come
from outside their home turf.
Of course, the complaints about discovery into peer review are not
baseless. Depositions are unpleasant and expensive, complying with
document requests is expensive, and lawyers are largely not scientists'
favorite companions (and are, too, expensive). 123 Between the incon
venience and expense, the availability of such discovery may be a dis
incentive to participate in peer review, especially given the fact that
most peer review is done as a professional obligation rather than for
pay.
Before addressing some ways to mitigate that disincentive, a real
ity check may help. Even if peer-review discovery becomes much more
widely adopted, depositions and document discovery will almost cer
tainly take place in a very small percentage of instances of peer re
view. Most scientific scholarship is simply not that interesting to
litigators, just like most legal scholarship is not that interesting to
scientists (or, sadly, others!). Thus, the universe of cases in which liti
gation is even on the horizon is small, and that universe is likely iden
tifiable in advance (e.g., articles about drugs, devices, toxic effects of
industries, and a handful of other items, plus perhaps some patentrelated scholarship). If a publisher chose not to accept for publication
122. Gould, supra note 7, at 19.
123. See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21 (noting the unpleasant manner in which peer
reviewers have been deposed).
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what I have described as litigation-driven scholarship,1 24 whether to
avoid hassle or because it concluded that the inherent biases militated
against such scholarship, the universe would get still smaller.
Alternatively, a journal could switch to an open peer-review pro
cess, with the reviewers' comments and identities open to anyone, sim
ilarly reducing discovery exposure. 12 5 Such a switch would reduce
both the likelihood and extent (and thus burden) of peer-review
discovery.
Journals also should require the disclosure of litigation relation
ships. By their terms, at least some journals' disclosure policies do not
require such disclosure at all.12 6 In contrast, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedurerequire expert witnesses to disclose the compensation
to be paid for their testimony.127 In at least those cases involving liti
gation-driven scholarship, authors should be obligated to disclose not
just the fact of their litigation work but also, at minimum, an estimate
of the payments received. In an era of expert witnesses on all sides
being paid up to $500 or more an hour for work and testimony, con
sumers of that scholarship should receive at least the same informa
tion that a jury would receive.12s
Further, the number of individual cases that would go beyond doc
ument discovery to depositions is even smaller, because, if the docu
ments indicate thorough and unbiased review, the attorneys are likely
to conclude that a deposition is not worth it. The litigation and hassle
exposure, in other words, would be small even if those involved in the
124. Though I think that litigation-driven scholarship is not inherently untrustwor
thy, a journal could rationally conclude otherwise, just as some have refused to
accept articles funded by industry. If anything, I think litigation-driven scholar
ship is less trustworthy than industry-funded work (as the intended outcome is
explicit in the former and less so in the latter), and so a policy rejecting litigationdriven work but accepting industry-funded work could be consistent.
125. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
126. See Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, FinancialAssociations of Authors,
346 NEW ENG. J MED. 1901, 1901 (2002), availableat http://content.nejm.org/cgi
content/full1346/24/1901 ("Because the essence of reviews and editorials is selec
tion and interpretation of the literature, the Journalexpects that authors of such
articles will not have any significant financial interest in a company (or its com
petitor) that makes a product discussed in the article."). "Significant" is defined
in that article as $10,000 or more in a year; insignificant interests are to be dis
closed in the article. Id. Notably, the policy makes no mention of involvement in
litigation, though the disclosure forms do note the relevance of expert work. See,
e.g., Letter from The New England Journal of Medicine Editorial Staff to Poten
tial Authors, Financial Disclosure & Authorship Form, http://authors.nejm.org/
misd/disclosRev.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). The form asks only for a "brief
description," not for dollar figures or the like. As noted above, even that is not
always disclosed. See supra note 6.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
128. Such information may well be valuable information in work that is not litigation
driven as well.
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peer-review process had no protection beyond the ordinary protections
in third-party discovery. This sort of discovery simply does not hap
pen that often today and is unlikely to happen much more often in the

future. 129
And yet there is legitimate concern, and therefore some ways to
mitigate the risks may be valuable, both in the publication process
and in the courts. As for reviewers and publishers, in those cases
where litigation seems possible (or in all cases, to better spread costs),
peer reviewers could demand that the publishers indemnify them for
expenses associated with discovery, including the cost of counsel and
the reviewers' time.13o (Often, of course, the parties to litigation end
up paying for the time of deponents, especially if the deponent is
outside the scope of the subpoena power.) The additional costs to the
publisher will be minimal at most, especially if its peer-review process
is solid and well documented (which is a good thing to encourage in all
events). The financial impact on the availability of qualified peer re
viewers should be minimal, with those costs able to be spread by the
publisher.
Yet peer-review discovery does create dangers not created by the
average discovery process, and concerns about academic freedom and
disincentives are not baseless. I therefore propose certain protections
that balance those legitimate concerns against the litigants' legitimate
interests in testing assertions.
When a party seeks discovery into research performed by a testify
ing expert and cited or relied upon by that expert-in other words, the
party seeks drafts of the work, reviewers' comments in the expert's
possession, editorial suggestions, and the like-that discovery should
be granted as a matter of course under the ordinary discovery protec
tions.131 Thus, if a party's discovery is not calculated to lead to the
discovery of relevant materials, it can properly be quashed, but no spe
cial protection is necessary. The expert has, after all, submitted him
129. A further reality check: While discovery into peer review is relatively new, re
search subpoenas have been around for at least a decade. See Jasanoff, supra
note 87. I am aware of no evidence, even anecdotal, that any researchers or re
viewers have in fact been deterred from getting involved in potentially litigationrelated research. The absence of declarations about it is not proof of its actual
absence, of course, but it is worth noting.
130. In fact, the book's co-publisher paid for the reviewers' legal fees in the depositions
related to Deceit and Denial. See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21.
131. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, in
cluding the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the ac
tion. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
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self to the process voluntarily and the courts' general protections
against harassment are sufficient.
When the party seeks to go further and take discovery into the
peer-review process, courts should follow two additional steps. First,
limited document discovery, including document subpoenas, limited
interrogatories, and similar methods, should be permitted, again
under the same processes used for ordinary third-party discovery.
The potential for intimidation and inconvenience is relatively small in
this context and can be mitigated, as noted above, through indemnifi
cation agreements. The identities of the peer reviewers, if previously
anonymous, could be redacted at this stage in the process as well.
If, upon the completion of this limited document discovery, the
party wishes to take the depositions of individuals not involved di
rectly in the litigation or to take further document discovery, includ
ing seeking the names of the reviewers, the court should require a
showing that the party has a reasonable basis to suspect that such
discovery will be pertinent to the litigation. Such a showing might
include a showing that the reviewer was not informed about the fact
that the author was paid by attorneys involved in the litigation (if the
scholarship is litigation-related), an indication to suspect that the re
viewer was either lax or not disinterested, or other arguments that the
process did not work as expected, such that the court should discount
or disregard the peer-review factor under Daubert. In the event that
the party opposing discovery can show a need, courts could use protec
tive orders to maintain the anonymity of the reviewers, at least for the
time being.
As part of this evaluative process, a court may find it beneficial to
have an expert who works for the court. 132 The expert could be chosen
by agreement of the parties, with the party seeking discovery respon
sible for his fees, and would be there essentially as a reality check for
the judge. Thus, the expert might be a researcher from a local univer
sity who could provide some perspective on whether the peer-review
process in question deviated significantly from the ordinary process
and whether a deposition was likely to provide something useful,
rather than being harassment.
If these safeguards are adopted with an eye to the potential harms
they seek to prevent, researchers will be protected from unnecessary
or harassing research, while parties will not have material evidence
blocked from view.

132.

Cf William Schulz, Judging Science, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 27,
2006, at 36-39 (noting proposals for court-appointed experts).
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CONCLUSION

Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence have, commendably,
sought to incorporate more of the reliability criteria from science into
courts' evaluation of expert testimony. This incorporation recognizes
the overlapping magisteria of law and science. Law and science alike
rely on testing and challenges to pursue reliable evidence-based con
clusions. While the respective disciplines obviously have many differ
ences, the bases on which they reach conclusions about the reliability
of methodologies and conclusions are strikingly similar.
These similarities have, as described above, led to both litigationdriven scholarship and to efforts to take discovery into the process of
obtaining publication in scientific literature, in particular the peer-re
view process. These two phenomena should not be surprising in light
of Daubert and, as I have argued above, should not be rejected as nec
essarily negative for either law or science.
Litigation-driven scholarship, while subject to many caveats, is not
necessarily any less trustworthy than scholarship driven by those who
fund it, whether that means pharmaceutical companies, government
agencies, or universities spending discretionary grant money. The
source of funding for studies, and the reasons for doing those studies
in the first place, are all considered relevant but not dispositive in
other contexts. No reason exists to treat the litigation relation of
scholarship differently.
Discovery into peer review has the potential to strengthen both law
and science. As for strengthening law, judges will better understand
the peer-review process once they have seen the results of this discov
ery, and will understand the truly complex and varied activities that
all fall within the umbrella term "peer review." More importantly, the
information received through that discovery is directly relevant to the
Daubert evaluation and will better filter expert testimony. As for
what science gets out of it, the possibility, even remote, of litigation
discovery will creative incentives for authors and reviewers to be care
ful, especially when they are authoring or reviewing litigation-driven
scholarship (where such discovery is most likely).
Allowing for the cross-fertilization of law and science in this con
text, then, will help both and, if appropriate protective measures are
used, will hurt neither. As in all aspects of litigation, courts must be
vigilant to avoid harassment or intimidation, especially with the addi
tional concerns of academic freedom. But those concerns are not so
great as to justify denying access to highly relevant materials. Simi
larly, concerns about the biases inherent in litigation-driven scholar
ship are not so great as to justify ignoring potentially important
scholarship. With proper care, the overlapping magisteria of law and
science can provide additional support for each other.

